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I. Introduction
Within the past five years, the telecommunications industry
has seen greater and more comprehensive reforms introduced and
implemented than in the previous fifty years.' Both the United
States and the European Union (EU) have undertaken these
initiatives. With the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
19962 (TA 96 or the Act), the United States saw years of
deregulation culminate in the introduction of competition into
local markets.' The European Union followed suit on January 1,
1998, and full telecommunications competition began in the newly
deregulated telecommunications industry . The new laws in both
the United States and the EU have incorporated some familiar
ideas from prior legislation. One concept embraced in both the
I See James N. Nafziger, Time to Pay Up: Internet Service Providers'
Universal Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37, 37 (1997).
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter TA 96 or the Act].
I See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach
of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1037, 1038. In return for the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) opening
up the local market to Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs) and Interexchange
Carriers (IXCs), the ILECs were compensated by permission to engage in long distance
(interexchange) telecommunications service contingent upon ILECs meeting the 14
point checklist provided in § 271 of the Act. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
4 See Council Resolution 93/1, 1993 O.J. (C 213) 1, 3; Council Resolution
94/3, 1994 O.J. (C 379) 4; Commission Directive 96/19, 1996 O.J. 13, 24 (L 74).
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American and EU legislation is "universal service."'
The concept of universal service has been variously defined
throughout the century.6 In general, universal service means
making available affordable telephone service regardless of
geographic locale.7 In the past, regulators pursued this utopian
notion by allowing local telecommunications companies to act as
natural monopolies. While the new regimes in the United States
and the EU have maintained an express dedication to keep
universal service a key component in their telecommunications
industries, they have undercut the traditional mechanisms to
establish such service. Specifically, by introducing a competitive
environment, both the international and domestic regulators have
taken away the historical funding mechanism of universal
service-cross-subsidies. 9
This article will examine the effect of competition in
implementing universal service by comparing U.S. and E.U.
legislation introduced during the competitive era. Part II begins by
outlining the basic governmental and regulatory structures in place
5 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1999); see also Council Directive 95/62,
1995 O.J. (L 321) 6, replaced by Directive 98/10 of the European Parliament and the of
the Council of 26 February 1996 on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP)
to Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive
Environment, 1998 OJ (L. 101) 24, [hereinafter ONP Voice Telephony Directive].
6 See Arturo Gandara, Equity in an Era of Markets: The Case of Universal
Service, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 109 (1998). The term was first coined by
Theodore Vail, president of AT&T in 1907, when he propagated the slogan "one
system, one policy, universal service." MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE
COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
TELEPHONE SYSTEM 39-40 (1997).
7 See Nichole L. Millard, Universal Service, Section 254 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Hidden Tax?, 50 FED. COMM. L. J. 255, 256 (1997).
8 A natural monopoly is an economic construct in which the marginal cost of
production or service declines with increasing economies of scale. See Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 31 (1995)
(discussing the concept of natural monopolies in the telecommunications industry).
9 See generally Livia Slonage West, Deregulating Telecommunications: The
Conflict Between Competition and Universal Service, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 159, 167
(1996) (discussing the system of cross-subsidies that have historically funded universal
service: higher long distance costs subsidized lower local cost, higher business rates
subsidized lower residential rates and higher urban charges subsidized lower rural
charges); see also infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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for regulating telecommunications in America and the EU.'0 Part
III explores the comprehensive procedures undertaken by the
United States and the EU in liberalizing their respective
telecommunications markets." Part IV engages in an overview of
the history behind universal service and then analyzes legislation
introduced and the current state of universal service in America
and the EU. 2 Part V concludes that although America and the EU
have passed goal-oriented universal service legislation,
implementation presently exists in a transient state. Furthermore,
both domestic and international regulatory agencies need to design
clear and concise standards for funding universal service in a
competitive environment.
II. Overview of Administrative Bodies Regulating
Telecommunications
A. European Union
Before it is possible to discuss regulation of
telecommunications in the European Union, it is imperative that
the general structure and history of the EU be explained. World
War II completely devastated the European economy." As a result
of this collapse in the post-war European market infrastructure, the
United States introduced an economic recovery package known as
the Marshal Plan." European leaders understood that complete
reliance on the United States would only exacerbate the political
and economic vacuum left as a result of the war. For this reason,
many European leaders discussed the possibility of implementing
pre-war plans of organizing a "political and economic partnership
of European nations."'16 Winston Churchill was the first person to
10 See infra notes 14-66 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 67-209 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 210-441 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 442-43 and accompanying text.
14 See Kapteyn, P.J.G., & VerLoren van Thermaat, P., INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 3 (Laurence W. Gormley et al. eds., 3d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter INTRO TO EC LAW].
is See id.
16 Id.
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give full post-war publicity to the notion of European integration. 7
During an address at the University of Zurich on September 19,
1946, Churchill advocated the necessity to build a United States of
Europe, of which a partnership between France and Germany
would be the first step.'8 Three years later Robert Schuman, the
French Foreign Minister, seized upon this idea in proposing what
is known as the Schuman Plan.' 9
During a press conference on May 9, 1950, at the Quay
d'Orsay, Schuman set forth the basic outline of the French plan.2°
France proposed to place all of the Franco-German coal and steel
output under a common High Authority that would be open to
participation by other European countries.2' This production under
a common Higher Authority with the power to render binding
decisions on all participating countries was a revolutionary step
toward a collective European governmental structure. Thus, the
Schuman Plan introduced a new element to the structure of
European economics where the "promotion of common interests
by states is wont to take place in international society."22 After
nine months of negotiations, the signing of the European Coal and
Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) on April 18, 1951, brought the
Schuman Plan to fruition.23
With the successful ratification of the ECSC Treaty, leaders
throughout Europe began to inquire further into the possibility of a
United States of Europe as proposed by Churchill. In the face of
failed attempts to organize a European Defense Community
(EDC),24 the Intergovernmental Committee released the Spaak
Report in April 1956.25 The report's foundation rested upon the
17 See id.
'" See id.
19 See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
20 See INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 1.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 1-2.
23 See id. at 7.
24 See generally id. at 9-13 (explaining the background, content, and ultimate
failure of the EDC).
25 See id. at 14 (citing Rapport des Chefs de Delegations aux Ministres des
Affaires Etrangeres, Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 21 April
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promotion of a common European market and the peaceful use of
26
atomic energy. At a meeting in Venice on May 29, 1956,
European Foreign Ministers agreed to use the Spaak Report as the
basis for negotiating treaties to carry out such mandates. 27 The
negotiations culminated in Rome on March 25, 1957, with the
signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC).8
As can be expected from a document creating a new common
market, the EEC Treaty contains numerous provisions. Some of
the more pertinent sections for the purpose of this paper include:
Articles 30 through 36, providing for the free movement of goods
among the member states; 29 Article 59, establishing the freedom to
provide services; 30 Article 85, prohibiting agreements between
member states which have "as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition;"3' Article 86, condemning
any "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position;
32
and Article 90, allowing government monopolies with the caveat
that the monopolies are "subject to Treaty competition rules to the
extent that 'the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to
them.' 3 3  Furthermore, the Treaty granted the European
Commission authority over government monopolies and invested
it with the power to "address appropriate directives or decisions to
Member States. 34
At the Paris Summit in October 1972, the Heads of State
throughout the European Community took another step toward
1956).
26 See INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 14.
27 See id. at 16.
28 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
29 See Mark Naftel, Countdown to 1998: Status of Telecommunications
Competition in Europe and Comparison with the United States, 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 1,4(1997).
30 See id.
31 EEC TREATY, supra note 28, art. 85.
32 Id. art. 86.
33 Id. art. 90(2).
34 Id. art. 90(3).
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achieving Europe's present governmental structure. The leaders
"assigned themselves the key objective of converting, before the
end of [the] decade and in absolute conformity with the signed
Treaties, all the relationships between Member States into a
European Union."' '35 Although the lofty goal of integration before
the end of the 1970's was not achieved, the movement once again
picked up momentum in 1984. On February 14, 1984, the
European Parliament adopted a draft treaty establishing theU on.6 This innovative proposal was followed twoEuropean no. 3  sinvtvepooa6asfl e 
years later with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) on
February 17, 1986.37
A renewed push occurred to develop a common economic
monetary unit (EMU) after the SEA went into effect on July 1,
1987.38 Many commentators argued that "a completed internal
market cannot continue to function without the keystone of an
EMU."39  For this reason the Strasbourg European Council
proposed in December 1989 "to convene an intergovernmental
conference before the end of 1990, for the purpose of amending
the EEC Treaty with a view to the final stages of EMU." 40 These
proposed modifications to the EEC Treaty came into law with the
signing of the Maastricht Amendments on February 7, 1992.4'
With the adoption of these amendments, the term "European
Communities" was supplanted by the designation "European
Union. 42
The purpose of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is "to
35 INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 32 (quoting Bull. EC 10-1972, at 23
(point 16 of the communique)).
36 See id. at 14 (citing 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33; Bull. EC 2-1984, point 1.1.2 at 8).
17 See 1984 O.J. (L 169) 1 (1987); 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending EEC TREATY,
supra note 28) [hereinafter SEA TREATY].
38 See generally INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 35-37 (discussing the
genesis of the EMU debate in the early 1970s and the rationale for the renewed impetus
in the late 1980s).
39 id. at 35.
40 Id. at 36.
41 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R.
573, incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TEU].
42 See Naftel, supra note 29, at 3.
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organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity,
relations between the Member States and their peoples., 43  The
major principles set forth in the TEU are:
[T]he creation of a European citizenship ... the strengthening
of the powers of the European Parliament, through the
introduction of the co-decision procedure, the right to set up
temporary Committees of Inquiry, the creation of a European
Ombudsman, the formalization of the right of petition to the
Parliament, the extension of the Assent procedure to certain
categories of international agreements, and participation in the
appointment of members of the Commission."
Another important provision is Article C of the TEU. Article
C provides that the European Union "is to be served by a single
institutional framework., 45 The European Council, the European
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice
comprise this single institutional framework.46  In short, "the
Commission proposes directives, the Council adopts them, and
Member States implement them.,
47
To aid in its vast administrative duties, the European
Commission is departmentalized into twenty-six Directorates-
General (DG).48 Of these, DG IV and DG XIII have played a
significant role in shaping the European Union's
telecommunications policies. 49 DG IV implements and enforces
European competition law and can be viewed as the equivalent to
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. ° DG
XIII parallels the United States' Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) and has authority over "European
telecommunications regulation, postal services, and research and
43 INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 48 (citing TEU art. A T 3).
44 Id. at 39 (citing arts. 189b, 189c, 189d, 189e and 228(3) EC; 20b, 20c, and
20d ECSC; 107b, 107c, and 107d Eurathon).
45 Id. at 49.
46 See id. at 49-50.
47 Naftel, supra note 29, at 5.
48 See INTRO TO EC LAW, supra note 14, at 202.
49 See Naftel, supra note 29, at 5.
50 See id. at 5-6.
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information services."5' Through the enforcement of their Article
90 powers,52 these divisions of the Directorates-General have
played a significant role in introducing competition into the EU's
telecommunications market.53 Just as the European Council and
the European Commission have authority to regulate
telecommunications markets,54 the United States also has a
bifurcated regulation mechanism. 55
B. United States
The regulation of American telecommunications can be
viewed in two distinct phases: pre-FCC and post-FCC. In 1910,
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was granted authority
to regulate telephone carriers.56 This authority lasted until 1934,
when the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
decided that the ICC was too "preoccupied with railroad regulation
and thus lacked the resources to oversee the large and growing
communications field."57 In this same year, Congress passed the
Communications Act of 1934.8 The preamble of the 1934 Act is
the genesis of the modem U.S. telecommunications regulatory
structure:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose
51 Id. at 6.
52 See infra note 77.
13 Naftel, supra note 29, at 6.
14 See Carl B. Kress, The 1996 Telekommunikationsgesetz and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Toward More Competitive Markets in
Telecommunications in Germany and the United States, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 551, 570
(1997).
15 See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
56 See THOMAS W. BONNETT, TELEWARS IN THE STATES: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ISSUES IN A NEW ERA OF COMPETITION 48 (1996).
" MUELLER, supra note 6, at 156.
58 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
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of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire
and radio communications, and for . . . centralizing authority
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting
additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign
commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a
commission to be known as the "Federal Communications
Commission", which shall be constituted as hereinafter
provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of
this Chapter.59
The FCC, "comprised of five commissioners appointed by the
President,"6o is an independent agency and is intended to remain
politically neutral. The fact that no more than three
commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party
reflects this intent." The commissioners serve five-year terms and
may be removed from their position only on a for-cause basis."
While the 1934 Act vested the FCC with authority over
interstate and foreign commerce in communication, it specifically
excluded intrastate telecommunications from the FCC's
63jurisdiction. Starting at the end of World War I, the states
created their own administrative authorities, known as Public
Utility Commissions (PUCs), to govern intrastate
telecommunications.64 Rationales advanced for the establishment
of PUCs included: concern that telephone companies would use
their monopoly status to overcharge customers; the need for
interconnection to ensure that duplication of services would not
occur; and an improvement of telephone services through state
regulation.65 Since their inception, PUCs have "determined the
rate structure for different services: local calls (residential and
" 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
60 Kress, supra note 54, at 572.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994); see also Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355 (1986) (ruling that the 1934 Communications Act prohibits federal
encroachment into intrastate matters unless existing language grants the FCC such
authority).
64 See BONNETr, supra note 56, at 49.
65 See id.
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business lines), intrastate toll calls, measured service, pay phones,
and directory assistance."66
III. Liberalization of the EU and American
Telecommunications Market
A. European Union
Prior to liberalization, telecommunications services in Europe
were provided by state-controlled monopolies of Post, Telegraph,
and Telephone (PTTs).67 This monopoly extended to all areas of
telecommunication service as the PTTs provided local service,
long distance service, and telephone equipment to their end
customers.6" Ostensibly, the Member States' participation in the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)69 guarded against
overreaching by state-run monopolies. In reality, the ITU was
powerless to control the monopolies since it "[had] no sanctions to
enforce compliance and no mandate to develop operational
services."7°  Thus, ITU's primary binding element-consent of
member nations-often clashed with each state's focus on
domestic interests.' The resulting lack of emphasis on
international cooperation produced "[c]onflicting national
66 Id. at 59.
67 See James Mark Naftel, The Natural Death of a Monopoly: Competition in EC
Telecommunications Terminals Judgment, EMORY INT'L L. REv. 449, 451 (1992).
68 See id.
69 In 1947, the International Telecommunications Convention (ITC) incorporated
the ITU as part of the United Nations. See International Telecommunications
Convention, Oct. 2, 1947, 63 Stat. 1399, 193 U.N.T.S. 188. The ITU was founded in
1865, when the "Austro-German and Western European Telegraph Unions merged to
supervise and establish standards on an interconnected regional network." ROB
FRIEDEN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 62 (1996). Today, the ITU
continues to be a forum advocating uniform rules as well as conflict management and
resolution in the international telecom market. See generally id. at 59-82 (giving an in-
depth analysis of the ITU's present and historical role).
70 Amy L. Lin, Comment, Telecommunications Competition in the European
Union After France v. Commission - The Terminal Equipment Case, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L.
355, 356 (1994) (quoting Anne W. Branscomb, Overview: Global Governance of
Global Networks, in TOWARD A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 5 (Anne
W. Branscomb ed., 1986)).
71 See Lin, supra note 70, at 356.
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standards, incompatible types of equipment, and . . . a generally
poor European telecommunications network. 7 2 By the late 1970s,
the European Community began to view a common approach to
telecommunications as an essential element, both in its economic
goals and world market position.73 Since 1984, the European
Community has been designing and implementing a uniform
European telecommunications policy.
7 4
1. EU Legislative Efforts Prior to Full-Market
Liberalization
a. The Green Paper
In a June 1987 Green Paper, the European Commission
published its blueprint for the future of telecommunications.75 The
Green Paper proposed ten key initiatives to prepare the European
telecommunications market for competition.
(1) The Member States should have the privilege of retaining
sole rights over the supply and operation of the national
network
(2) Where it is deemed essential in the interest of the public
service, the Member States should have the right to confer
special or sole rights for the provision of reserved services.
(3) The provision of all services, other than voice telephony,
should be unimpeded and open to both independent
telecom providers and the Telecommunications
Administrations.
(4) In order to preserve uniform operating standards, pre-
72 Naftel, supra note 67, at 452.
73 See Lin, supra note 70, at 358.
74 See Constantine J. Zepos, Note, Liberalizing the "Scared Cows":
Telecommunications and Postal Services in the EC, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 203,
207 (1992).
75 See Commission of the European Communities, Toward a Dynamic European
Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290, final [hereinafter Green
Paper].
76 See Lin, supra note 70, at 370-72 (quoting in part Green Paper, supra note
118 [Vol. 25
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existing standards for network structure and services
should be stringently observed.
(5) The Community, via a Directive, should clearly define the
limits and nature of national network providers' authority
to impose conditions upon competitive service providers.
(6) Member States should not restrict the free flow of
approved terminal equipment to or from other Member
States, with an interim exception granted for supply of the
first telephone set to an end-user.
(7) The regulatory powers of the Telecommunication
Administrations should be independent from any
operational duties which they may be called on to perform.
(8) Every network provider's commercial or operational
activities should be subject to "strict and continuous"
review by the European Commission for compliance with
Articles 85, 86, and 90 of the EC Treaty.
(9) In order to prevent an abuse of a dominant position by a
new influential private provider, the operations of all
private operators should be subject to close review by the
Commission.
(10)The Community's common policy on telecommunications
should apply to all operators' actions and agreements withS71
other Community members or third party countries.
As the following sections illustrate, the Commission, using its
Article 90 powers,77  implemented a series of Directives
incorporating almost all of the provisions proposed by the Green
Paper.
77 See EEC TREATY supra note 28, art. 90.
Article 90(1) of the EEC TREATY States:
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
Article 90(2) states that the monopolies allowed by Article 90(1) are subject to Treaty
competition rules to the extent that "the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them."
Article 90(3) states: "The commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of
this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to
member States."
1999] 119
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b. Equipment Directive
In May 1988, the Commission issued the Equipment Directive,
which calls for competition in telecommunications terminal
equipment." The preamble of the Directive sets forth the goals of
"technical progress, consumer choice, the elimination of
restrictions on imports from other Member States, fair
competition, and mutual acceptance of goods legally manufactured
and marketed in other Member States. 79  The Equipment
Directive furthers these objectives by requiring Member States to:
(1) withdraw special rights and ensure freedom of all operators to
import, market, and utilize terminal equipment; (2) announce all
pertinent technical specifications for terminal equipment; (3)
ensure that an independent body is charged with the duty to carry
out regulatory functions; and (4) compel telecom operators to
release any customer who contracted for long term service during
the period of operator monopoly, if the customer requests
discharge from the contract.8°
Resistance to the Equipment Directive led to the case of
France v. Commission,' in which the Commission's Article 90
authority to implement market liberalization was affirmed. The
Commission used this authority over the next ten years to
introduce laws that would ready the EU for full competition in its
telecommunications markets.82
c. Service Directive
On June 28, 1990, the Commission took another step toward
implementing the proposals set forth in the 1987 Green Paper by
78 See Commission Directive 88/301 of 16 May 1998 on Competition in the
Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L. 131) 73, aff'd in
part rev'd in part sub. Non., Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-
1223 [1991] 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1991), (affirming that Article 90 of the EEC TREATY
confers power on the EC Commission rather than the European Council to enact a
directive abolishing special and exclusive rights of commercialization and link up of
terminal equipment) [hereinafter Equipment Directive].
79 Naftel, supra note 29, at 9.
80 See id.
81 See 1991 E.C.R. 1-1223, 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1991).
82 See infra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
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issuing the Telecommunications Service Directive." The Service
Directive was designed to break the state-owned monopolies'
stranglehold on telephone services. The Commission achieved
this goal by requiring Member States to "withdraw all special or
exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunication services
other than voice telephony," thus allowing private operators
entrance into the market.85 As with the Equipment Directive, the
implementation of the Service Directive met with resistance.
Three Member States-Spain, Belgium, and Italy-brought an
action claiming that the Commission's Article 90 authority did not
extend to authorizing private companies to provide tele-
86
communication services. Although the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) annulled two parts of the Directive, 7 the ruling ultimately
strengthened the Commission's role as a catalyst in the
liberalization process. Specifically, the Court fortified the
Commission's growing base of power by affirming that Article 90
does not simply give the Commission oversight power, but also
the authority to implement new legislation. 8 The Commission
used this legal victory to further blaze a path toward a competitive
European telecommunications market 9
83 See Commission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the
Markets for Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J. (L 192), aff'd in part, annulled in
part sub. nom., Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, Kingdom of Spain v.
Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833, [1991-1993 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) T 96,755 (1992) (affirming the Commission's authority pursuant to Article 90, to
empower private companies to provide telecommunications and information services,
with the limited exception of voice telephony) [hereinafter Service Directive].
84 See Zepos, supra note 74, at 212.
85 Service Directive, supra note 83, art. 2.
86 See Kingdom of Spain, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833, [1991-1993 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96,755 (1992).
87 The ECJ found that Article I was overly broad in its abolishing of special
rights, because the legislation did not set forth in unambiguous terms which rights were
being targeted. See id. at paras. 49-50. Second, the ECJ invalidated Article 8. See id. at
paras. 55-57. Article 8 implemented the Green Paper's recommendation that any
previously entered long-term supply contract could be rescinded at the customer's
request when the Directive came into force. See id.
88 See Zepos, supra note 74, at 212.
89 See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
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d. Open Network Provision Directive
In the 1995 Open Network Provision (ONP) Directive,9" the
European Council made great strides towards Community-wide
harmonization of the telecommunications industry. The intent
behind the ONP was to compel incumbent telecommunications
providers to unbundle network elements and grant access to
potential competitive operators. 9' To accomplish this goal the
European Council announced the general principal that "network
elements necessary to provide non-reserved telecommunications
services should be made available on nondiscriminatory and
publicly known terms."92  Subsequently, the ONP Voice
Telephony Directive adopted on February 26, 1998, replaced this
legislation.93 The goal of the revised directive is to "ensure the
availability throughout the Community of good quality telephone
services, and to define the services available to all users, in the
context of Universal Service.,
94
e. Full Competition Directive
In 1996, the Commission amended the Service Directive with
the Full Competition Directive.9 By adopting this amendment, the
Commission continued to reduce the number of services
previously considered reserved.96 At the time the Full Competition
90 See ONP Voice Telephony Directive, supra note 5.
91 See Naftel, supra note 29, at 14.
92 Id.
93 See ONP Voice Telephony Directive, supra note 5.
9, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: DIRECTORATE GENERAL XIII, STATUS REPORT ON
EUROPEAN UNION TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, UPDATE: OCTOBER 1998, 42 (1998)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN UNION TELECOM POLICY].
95 See Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, amending Directive
90/388 with Regard to the Implementation of Full Competition in Telecommunications
Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13 [hereinafter Full Competition Directive].
96 Within four years after the original Service Directive went into effect, see
supra note 83, the Commission passed amendments to expand its scope to include: (1)
satellites, see Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive
88/301 and Directive 90/388 in Particular with Regard to Satellite Communications,
1994 O.J. (L 268) 15; (2) cable television, see Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18
October 1995 amending Directive 90/388 with Regard to the Abolition of the
Restrictions on the use of Cable Television Networks for the Provision of Already
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Directive came into effect only two reserved services remained:
voice telephony and public telecommunications networks. 97 The
Full Competition Directive laid the ground work for full
competition by requiring that all "exclusive and special rights for
provision of voice telephony must be eliminated by January 1,
1998. "98 Furthermore, Member States were advised to ensure that
existing telecom operators announced their terms and conditions
for interconnection by July 1, 1997. 99 The new telecom operators
could then accept the posted terms or enter into negotiations with
the existing provider.'0° However, under the Full Competition
Directive, if the new operator and the incumbent are not able to
reach mutually acceptable terms for interconnection, the individual
Member State must decide the terms at issue.' 1 These issues of
interconnection were further clarified in a June 1997 Directive. 2
f Interconnection Directive
Understanding the importance of securing competitive
operators' access to existing consumers, the European Parliament
and Council adopted the Interconnection Directive in June 1997.'0'
The Directive's objective is "to guarantee the rights of market
players to obtain interconnection with the networks of others
where this is reasonably justified. ' 4  In order to level the
negotiating field between providers who have significant market
Liberalized Telecommunications Services, 1995 O.J. (L 256) 49; and (3) mobile
services, see Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive
90/388 with Regard to Mobile and Personal Communications, 1996 O.J. (L 20) 59.
97 See Naftel, supra note 29, at 13.
98 Kress, supra note 54, at 559.
99 See Naftel, supra note 29, at 11.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
June 1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring
Universal Service and Interoperability Through Application of the Principles of Open
Network Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter ONP Interconnection
Directive].
103 See id.
104 EUROPEAN UNION TELECOM POLICY, supra note 94, at 44.
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power05 and new competitive operators, the Interconnection
Directive places certain responsibilities on the former. Such
obligations include "requirements for non-discrimination, for
publication of a reference interconnection offer, including
interconnect price lists, for cost oriented interconnection tariffs
supported by transparent cost accounting systems, and for
accounting separation in certain cases.' ' 6
With the arrival of full competition, the Commission has also
adopted a Recommendation on interconnection in a liberalized
market.' 7 The first part of the Recommendation, which was
adopted on January 8, 1998, covers interconnection pricing.' 8 Part
1 advocates the use of long-run average incremental costs for
calculating cost oriented interconnection charges.' 9 Part 2 of the
Recommendation was adopted in April 199810 and deals with
"Accounting Separation and Cost Accounting Systems for
implementation of interconnection obligations with particular
regard to the principles of transparency and cost orientation."'1
The legislation discussed in the foregoing paragraphs laid the
foundation for full competition in the European Union's
telecommunication market. These efforts came to fruition on
January 1, 1998, as the EU implemented its plan for full
liberalization." 1
2
105 There is a presumption of significant market power where an operator has
more than 25 percent of the pertinent market. See id. at 45. This presumption can be
varied by the Member States' National Regulatory Authority (NRA). See id.
106 Id.
107 See Commission Recommendation 98/198/EC of 8 January 1998 on
Interconnection in a Liberalized Telecommunications Market, 1998 O.J. (L 73) 42
[hereinafter Interconnection Recommendation].
108 See id. pt. 1.
109 See EUROPEAN UNION TELECOM POLICY, supra note 94, at 46.
110 See Commission Recommendation 98/322/EC of 8 April 1998 on
Interconnection in a Liberalized Telecommunications Market, Part 2-Accounting
Separation and Cost Accounting, 1998 O.J. (L 141) 6.
I EUROPEAN UNION TELECOM POLICY, supra note 94, at 46.
112 Transition periods have been granted to five Member States, with the
following deadlines for full liberalization: Ireland-January 1, 2000, see Commission
Decision 114/97, 1997 O.J. (L 41) 8; Spain-January 1, 1998, see Commission
Decision 603/97, 1997 O.J. (L 243) 48; Luxembourg-July 1, 1998, see Commission
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B. United States
1. The Rise of AT&T
The United States shares a similar history with the EU in that
its telecommunications market has been monopolized for the
majority of this century. However, unlike the EU, a private
corporation monopolized the telecom industry in the U.S. instead
of a state-controlled actor.' 3 Since its creation, the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) has been a dominant
entity in the telecommunications industry.14  Formed in 1885,
AT&T was designed to develop long distance service for the Bell
monopoly." 5 In a 1900 stock purchase, AT&T- which until that
point had been a subsidiary of the American Bell Company-
became the Bell System's parent company.16
When Bell's primary patent ended in 1894, the number of
competing providers grew at an exponential rate."7 By 1902, three
thousand commercial telephone systems existed to challenge the
Bell System."8 This Competition between the non-interconnected
telephone service providers within a community is known as "dual
service.""' 9 AT&T's goal was "the elimination of dual service and
the creation of a nationally interconnected monopoly administered
by Bell but supervised by regulators."'
20
Decision 568/97, 1997 O.J. (L 234) 7; Portugal-January 1, 2000, see Commission
Decision 310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 133) 19; and Greece-December 31, 2000, see
Commission Decision 607/97, 1997 O.J. (L 245) 6.
113 See generally PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN
PRICES AND POLITICS (1987) (detailing the rise and fall of AT&T's monopoly in
American telephony).
114 See id.
15 See GERALD W. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE
DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 105 (1981). The Bell Company's monopoly was
derived from Alexander Graham Bell's patent on the telephone, which was granted on
January 30, 1877. See id. at 90.
116 See id. at 118. As parent company for American Bell, AT&T reserved the
final word on all policies implemented in the Bell System. See id. For this reason,
"AT&T" and "Bell" will be used interchangeably throughout this section.
17 See id. at 112.
118 See id.
119 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 7.
120 Id. at 107.
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AT&T used two main policies to achieve its goal of
eliminating dual service: sublicensing and buyout efforts.2 By
sublicensing independent operators in smaller cities, AT&T
shrewdly planned to isolate and eventually squeeze out the
remaining competitive telephone systems. 22 This strategy paid
off, and the amount of Bell-connecting independent telephones
vaulted from 297,218 in 1907 to nearly two-thirds of all
independent phones by 1914.123 In larger cities and urban areas,
AT&T followed a different course and simply abolished dual
service by buying out the competing exchanges. 24 This buyout
policy had the same devastating effect on competition as
sublicensing. By 1912, dual service competition had been
eliminated in ten out of the sixty-eight U.S. cities with
populations over 50,000.125
The public decried these actions as attempts to monopolize the
telephone industry, causing antitrust lawsuits to be filed at the
state level.'26 Furthermore, a number of national businesses asked
the Attorney General to intervene and file suit against AT&T and
the Bell system for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 127 In
order to avoid litigation, AT&T agreed to the Kingsbury
Commitment,'28 whereby AT&T promised to sell its stock in
Western Union, to allow independents to interconnect with Bell
lines, and to stop acquiring companies in direct competition with
the Bell System.
29
Many hailed this agreement as the dike that stopped AT&T's
wave of acquisitions. The U.S. Congress, however, took the bite
out of the agreement when it passed the Willis-Graham Act in
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 109-10.
124 See id. at 111-12.
125 See id. at 112.
126 See BROCK, supra note 115, at 154.
127 See id. at 155.
128 See id. The Kingsbury Commitment was agreed to by AT&T and the U.S.
Department of Justice in 1913. See ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF
AT&T 48 (1989).
29 See id.
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1921.130 The major effect of the Act was to exempt telephone
company mergers from antitrust review, thus invalidating this
important check on AT&T's expansion. 3' Consequently, in the
thirteen years between enactment of the Willis-Graham Act and
the creation of the FCC, the ICC certified 271 out of 274 telephone
merger and acquisition cases.'32
2. First Challenges of Competition-Specialized Long
Distance
At the time the FCC was created in 1934,133 AT&T owned and
operated virtually all of the country's long distance lines and the
majority of local service lines.1 4 The U.S. Government seemed
willing to accept AT&T's monopoly, so long as federal and state
agencies were able to effectively regulate the powerful
corporation.3 Thus, the Bell System continued its stranglehold on
the United States phone market until the first stages of competition
gave the government reason to rethink its position.
3 6
In November 1956, the FCC considered a petition that
challenged AT&T's monopoly in private lines for the first time in
nearly thirty years. 37 The Commission reviewed a proposal to
alter existing law in order to allow private party use of microwave
systems operating radio frequencies above 890 megahertz.' The
FCC ruled that private microwave systems could be employed
wherever existing providers could or would not provide these
services as requested by the end-user."' This decision opened the
door for an unknown upstart who would eventually become one of
130 See Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921).
131 See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND
LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 133 (1997).
132 See STONE, supra note 128, at 48.
133 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
134 See TEMIN, supra note 113, at 12.
131 See id.
136 See infra notes 137-61 and accompanying text.
137 See TEMIN, supra note 113, at 28.
131 See id.
13' See Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359,
recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825, (1960).
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AT&T's chief rivals.
On December 31, 1963, a company named Microwave
Communications Inc. (MCI), sought authorization from the FCC
to build and operate a microwave communication system between
Chicago and St. Louis.140 The application for approval filed by
MCI was "designed to prevent useless duplication of facilities with
consequently higher charges upon the users of the service."' 4 ' To
avoid having its petition summarily dismissed, MCI claimed its
service was new and not currently marketed by the Bell System.
4 1
AT&T, Illinois Bell, GTE, and Western Union all petitioned the
FCC to deny the request, but the Commission approved the
application on August 13, 1969.' 4  Although this was the first
major blow to AT&T's monopoly, it certainly would not be the
last.
3. Competition in Equipment
To fully understand how the American telecommunications
market was opened up for competition in equipment sales during
the 1970s, it is necessary to engage in a cursory review of two
precedent setting cases from the 1960s: Hush-A-Phone'44 and
Carterfone. 141
The Hush-A-Phone was a cup-like device that attached to a
telephone and provided some measure of speaking privacy.
46
When AT&T began informing customers that the device violated
its tariff forbidding attachments of non-phone company-provided
equipment, the Hush-A-Phone company filed a complaint with the
FCC. 47 The FCC, however, agreed with AT&T, and Hush-A-
Phone immediately appealed the decision. A federal court
140 See STONE, supra note 128, at 158.
141 4 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2500 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1973).
142 See STONE, supra note 128, at 159.
143 See In Re MCI, 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 16 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1037 (1969), reh'g
denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190, Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 226 (1970).
144 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. U.S., 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
145 See Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), 13 Rad. Reg.2d 597 (1968).
146 See Hush-A-Phone, 238 F.2d at 267.
147 See id. at 268.
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overruled the FCC decision, setting the principle that "some public
harm must be shown in order to justify restrictive tariff provisions
and that it is not the right of the telephone company to regulate
how a subscriber uses his telephone so long as the only impact of
the subscriber's use is to affect his own conversations.' 48
In Carterfone, AT&T once again challenged an equipment
manufacture. Carter Electronics Corporation developed a system
to connect mobile radio telephones to the local phone network. 149
Since the Carterfone connected a telephone line with other
channels of communication, AT&T argued the device violated its
tariff and threatened to disconnect customers using the
apparatus. 5° Although the Commission did find Carter Electronics
to be in violation of AT&T's tariff, it held the tariff itself to be
unreasonably discriminatory and ordered the company to file new
tariffs, which would allow devices not causing actual harm. 5'
AT&T responded by filing a tariff requiring any customers
wanting to attach non-phone company provided equipment to use
a Protective Connecting Arrangement (PCA)."' In form, the tariff
allowed customers to link any terminal equipment to the network,
provided it was done via a PCA.'53 However, in practice, AT&T
retained its dominance over standard phone equipment because
"the charge for the extension telephone was less than the charge
for the PCA required for connection of a privately supplied
telephone."'
15 4
In response to public pressure, the FCC organized a panel of
members of the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate
submitted information, and inquire as to alternative options
148 See BROCK, supra note 115 at 239. See also Hush-A-Phone, 238 F.2d at 268-
69.
149 See Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 420.
15o See id.
'51 See id. at 425-26. See also GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY
FOR THE INFORMATION AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 85 (1994) (discussing the
effects of the Carterfone case on the telecommunications industry).
152 See BROCK, supra note 151, at 86.
'53 See id. at 87.
154 Id.
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available to protect network integrity.'55 The panel concluded that
while network protection was essential, it could be provided either
by PCAs or a program designed to set standards and certify
equipment. '  As the FCC started to shift to "certification
standards as an alternative technical protection, the entire terminal
equipment market became potentially subject to competition." '157
The states, however, realized that this new trend toward
certification could have an impact on their intrastate markets. In
response, North Carolina struck preemptively at the FCC's new
course of action.
58
The North Carolina Utilities Commission proposed a rule
prohibiting the use of customer-provided equipment and further
required that all phone equipment used to make intrastate calls be
owned and maintained by the phone company.19 In 1974, the FCC
responded by issuing a declaratory ruling prohibiting state action
inconsistent with prior FCC rulings concerning interconnection of
end-user owned telephone equipment.60  Accordingly, North
Carolina appealed the ruling to the Fourth Circuit, which
subsequently upheld the order.'6' With this decision, AT&T
effectively lost its monopoly on telephone equipment.
4. Anti-Trust Suit and Divestiture
Historically, little incentive existed for the government to
apply antitrust laws against AT&T so long as the latter kept
monopolizing the telecom market.'62 However, with competition
growing due to the FCC opening up specialized long distance and
terminal equipment sales, there were plenty of new private actors
to file suit. By 1974, thirty-five antitrust lawsuits were filed by
155 See STONE, supra note 128, at 217.
156 See id.
157 BROCK, supra note 151, at 91.
158 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
159 See BROCK, supra note 151, at 91.
160 See id.
161 See Telerent Leasing Corp. et al., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd sub nom.
North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
162 See BROCK, supra note 115, at 295.
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private parties against AT&T or its subsidiaries.'63 In late 1974,
the Department of Justice joined many of the prior cases and filed
a new antitrust suit against AT&T.'64 AT&T was accused of
monopolizing the equipment and the long distance and local
service markets. 165 Consequently, the Justice Department asked for
the dissolution of AT&T with three separate companies formed in
the respective monopolized markets. 1
66
In 1982, after eight years of litigation, AT&T negotiated a
consent decree with the Department of Justice. 67 The following
summarizes the details contained in the agreement:
AT&T would divest itself of all operating companies but retain
its Western Electric and Long Lines divisions .... The newly
independent operating companies would be allowed to provide
only 'local' services so as to prevent the reassembly of the
vertical monopoly that provoked the case in the first place.
Finally, AT&T was to be freed of the restrictions on its
activities that were built into the 1956 decree, thereby
permitting it to enter other electronics businesses, including
computers. 168
As part of the 1984 Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), seven
Regional Bell Companies (RBOCs) were created out of the
existing Bell companies. 16' The RBOCs were required to allow
any long distance company equal access to the network.7 °
Furthermore, the RBOC's were forbidden to engage in competitive
telecom ventures, such as equipment manufacturing, information
services and long-distance services, outside designated areas
163 See id.
164 See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 103 S.Ct. 1240 (1983).
165 See BROCK, supra note 115, at 297.
166 See id.
167 See STONE, supra note 128, at 327.
168 BONNETT, supra note 56, at 51 (quoting ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE
BREAKUP, 38-39 (1991)).
169 See id. The seven RBOCs created were Pacific Telesis, U.S. West,
Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, Bell South, Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. See STONE,
supra note 128, at 331.
170 See BONNETr, supra note 56, at 51.
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known as local access and transport areas (LATAs)."7' The
restriction on providing information services was subsequently
removed in 1991.172
Divestiture ended the hundred-year monopoly AT&T enjoyed
in the American telecommunications market. Yet, full
competition in the telephone industry still did not exist. In 1996,
Congress passed legislation in hopes of bringing true competition
to the U.S. telecommunications market.1
73
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996
Signed on February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (TA 96 or the Act) 174 was the most comprehensive reform of
American telecommunications law since 1934.17' At the signing of
the Act, President Clinton commented, "[tioday, with the stroke of
a pen, our laws will catch up with our future. We will help to
create an open marketplace where competition and innovation can
move as quick as light."' 76 At the heart of TA 96 is a quid pro quo,
171 The MFJ created 164 LATAs, and telephone service within each LATA is
provided by a local incumbent carrier (LEC). See id. States may regulate InterLATA
calls provided that calling locations are within state lines, while the FCC regulates those
InterLATA calls crossing state lines. See id.
172 See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 993
F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993). It should be noted that this provision has been partially
reinstated by § 274 of TA 96. Section 274 limits the ability of Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) to provide informational databases or dissemination of current
events analogous to news services. The Act groups these types of services under the
broad penumbra of "electronic publishing." See 47 U.S.C. § 274. In Bell South v.
FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C.Cir. 1998), Bell South claimed that this restriction was both a
bill of attainder and a violation of its Freedom of Speech under the First Amendment
and therefore, sought judicial review of the FCC Order. On May 5, 1998, the D.C.
Circuit rejected both of these challenges and denied Bell South's petition for review.
See id.
173 See infra notes 174-208 and accompanying text.
171 See TA 96, supra note 2.
175 See Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Challenge
of Competition, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1255 (1997).
176 Id. (quoting President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at the
Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications Act, available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/eop/op/optelecom/release.html>) (visited October 5,
1999).
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with RBOCs now able to enter the long distance77  and
manufacturing industry in return for opening up their local markets
to new competition."' With respect to competition in telephony,
there are five key sections to the Act: Sections 251, 252, 253, 254,
and 271. The subsequent paragraphs will give an overview of
each section's key provisions, with Section 254 (universal service)
reserved for discussion in Part IV.'
79
a. Section 251
The successful implementation of Section 251 is the key to
bringing competition to the local markets. 8 ° Section 251 has three
subsections delineating specific requirements for all companies,
local exchange carriers (LECs), and incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs).'8'
Subsection (a) requires that all "telecommunication carriers
must interconnect either directly/indirectly with other carriers" and
not establish network features which violate compliance
requirements set forth in Sections 255 and 256.182
Subsection (b) provides that LECs must comply with
subsection (a) and: (1) they may not preclude resale of their phone
services; (2) they must provide number portability and dialing
parity to competitors; "' (3) permit access to phone numbers,
operator assistance and directory listings on a nondiscriminatory
177 The RBOCs entry into the long-distance market is predicated on their
satisfying the requirements of a fourteen-point checklist outlined in § 271. See infra
notes 206-07.
178 See Charles M. Oliver, The Information Superhighway: Trolls at the Tollgate,
50 FED. COMM. L. J. 53, 61 (1997).
179 See infra notes 297-441 and accompanying text.
180 See Bruning, supra note 175, at 1258.
181 See id. at 1259.
182 BONNETT, supra note 56, at 81.
183 Dialing parity allows end-users to dial "1" plus the area code to access their
preferred interexchange (long distance) carrier. In the absence of dialing parity, the
consumer would have to dial the long distance provider's access code in order to have it
carry the call. See id. at 142. Presently, there is a great marketing effort by competitors
of preferred long distance providers to circumvent "1" plus dialing. Service providers,
such as Telecom USA, now offer access to their long distance networks through bypass
codes such as 10-10-321.
19991 133
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
basis; (4) allow competitors access to rights of way on terms
compatible with Section 224 and; (4) "establish reciprocal
compensation agreements for transport/termination of
telecommunications traffic.'
18 4
Subsection (c) is arguably the most important provision of
Section 251, since ILECs, as owners of the existing network, act
as gatekeepers. Subsection (c) requires that ILECs adhere to all
provisions in subsections (a) and (b).'85 In addition to these
requirements, ILECs also have six additional obligations placed
upon them: The ILEC must 1) negotiate the terms of Section 251
in good faith;'86 (2) provide competitors just and reasonable rates
for interconnection;'87 (3) grant access to their networks elements
on an unbundled basis; 88 (4) provide retail services to competitors
at wholesale prices, so that competitors can offer the services for
resale;' 89 (5) give reasonable notice of any network changes that
could impede or prevent interoperability with competitors;' 90 and
(6) allow competitors to physically locate on their premises unless
such location is impracticable due to technical or logistical
191
reasons.
On June 1, 1996, the FCC adopted rules to implement Section
251.192 Many states and RBOCs disagreed with the FCC's rules
and subsequently filed appeals.9 3  The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated pricing rules and other aspects of the order as
beyond the FCC's jurisdiction, agreeing that primary authority to
implement rules on local competition rests with the states. 94 On
January 25, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on an appeal of
184 Id. at 81.
185 See id.
186 See TA 96, supra note 2, § 251 (c)(1).
187 See id. § 251(c)(2).
188 See id. § 251(c)(3).
189 See id. § 251(c)(4).
190 See id. § 251(c)(5).
191 See id. § 251(c)(6).
192 See Bruning, supra note 175, at 1263.
193 See e.g., Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
194 See id. at 800, 804, 805-06.
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this decision, reversing in part and affirming in part. 95
The Court vacated FCC Rule 319, which required incumbent
carriers to provide access to network elements, on the grounds that
it "did not adequately consider the § 251(d)(2) 'necessary and
impair' standards when it gave requesting carriers blanket access
to network elements."'96 Although the Court struck down the FCC
Rule, it did reverse the Court of Appeals on a more significant
issue. Writing for a splintered majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
stated that the "FCC has general jurisdiction to implement the
1996 Act's local-competition provisions."'97  Furthermore, the
Court held that the "FCC's rulemaking authority extends to
implementation of §§ 251 and 252."'9 The effect of the ruling is
to authorize "the FCC, not the states, to set rules governing the
prices and terms the five Bells can demand from new rivals in
return for access to their networks."' 99
191 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999).
196 Id. at 734. In deciding what network elements should be unbundled, the FCC
is required to consider whether access to a proprietary network element is necessary and
whether neglecting to provide access to a network element would "impair the ability of
the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to
offer." TA 96, supra note 2, § 251 (d)(2)(A), (B).
197 119 S.Ct. at 732.
198 Id.
199 High Court Zing Bells, News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), January
26, 1999, at D1. On September 15, 1999, in response to the Supreme Court's decision,
the FCC released its modified rules on unbundling of network elements. See Federal
Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-238, adopted September 15,
1999. The adopted Order sets a standard for determining whether an incumbent must
unbundle a network element. See FCC News, Report No. 99-41, FCC Promotes Local
Telecommunications Competition, Adopts Rules on Unbundling of Network Elements,
September 15, 1999. Under the revised standards, incumbents must provide unbundled
access to the following six network elements:
" Loops, including loops to provide high capacity and advanced
telecommunications services. However, it is important to note that the
FCC declined, except in limited circumstances, to require LECs to provide
unbundled access to facilitates providing high-speed Internet access and
other data services;
" Network interface devices;
" Local circuit switching (except for customers with four or more lines located
in the top fifty Metropolitan Statistical Areas);
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b. Section 252
Interconnection arrangements mandated by Section 251 have
been riddled with pitfalls. Given the ILECs' market power,
negotiations between incumbents and new entrants can often lead
to obstacles preventing the parties from reaching mutual
agreements. Congress predicted this obvious outcome and
countered the dilemma by incorporating a fall back provision in
Section 252, which provides that state utility commissions must
mediate or arbitrate any unresolved issues arising out of Section
251 negotiations, if petitioned by an interested party.
2
00
Furthermore, there is a provision authorizing an aggrieved party to
appeal the state commissions' decision in federal court.0
c. Section 253
Section 253 is the catch-all provision in TA 96. It declares that
"[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local
legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting
the ability of an entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
,,102 efctelecommunications services. The effect of this provision is to
grant federal preemption of any state or local law that prohibits or
203impedes a party from offering telecommunication services.
d. Section 271
Section 271 effectively nullifies the portion of the 1984
Modified Final Judgment restricting Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) from providing long distance phone service.2 04 Effective
immediately after the Act's signing, any BOC certified by the
FCC could once again compete in the long distance phone
" Dedicated and shared transport;
" Signaling and call-related databases; and,
" Operations support systems.
Id.
200 See TA 96, supra note 2, § 252(a)(2), (b).
201 See id. § 252(e)(6).
202 Id. § 253(a).
203 See BONNE'T", supra note 56, at 88.
204 See Bruning, supra note 175, at 1278.
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market. O In order to obtain certification, BOCs must first meet a
fourteen-point checklist set forth in Section 27 1.026 The requisite
criteria include: (1) interconnection; (2) nondiscriminatory access
to network elements; (3) nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts,
conduits, and rights-of-way; (4) local loop transmission from the
central office to the customer's premises; (5) local transport from
the trunk side of a wireline exchange carrier switch; (6) local
switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or
other services; (7) nondiscriminatory access to 911, directory
assistance, and operator call completion services; (8) white page
directory listings for customers of other carriers; (9)
nondiscriminatory access to phone numbers; (10)
nondiscriminatory access to database and signaling necessary for
call routing; (11) interim number portability; (12)
nondiscriminatory access to services or information allowing
requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity; (13) reciprocal
compensation arrangements; and (14) telecommunications services
available for resale.2 °7
The preceding paragraphs have discussed the means by which
competition has been implemented in American and EU
telecommunications markets. While there have been great strides
in liberalizing the telephone industry, another important area has
changed the face of telecommunications. Namely, both the EU
and the United States have taken significant steps toward
establishing a universal service obligation in their respective
countries. 2 ' The following sections provide a brief history of
universal service and then discuss the legislation introduced in a
competitive market to promote this social policy goal.2 9
205 See id. at 1279.
206 See TA 96, supra note 2, § 271(c)(2).
207 See id.
208 See infra notes 226-441 and accompanying text.
209 See infra notes 210-441 and accompanying text.
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IV. Universal Service
A. Historical Overview
Nearly all scholars agree that the term "universal service" was
first coined by Theodore Vail, president of AT&T, when he
propagated the slogan "one system, one policy, universal
service.,, 2'0 Nevertheless, there is a great deal of debate on what
Vail meant by this concept. For example, many historians assert
that AT&T's policies under Vail were the antecedents to
contemporary notions of regulations promoting affordable
telephone access through a system of cross-subsidies. 211 As one
author summarized AT&T's early relationship with regulators,
"AT&T committed itself to attaining universal service, so that
virtually everyone who desired a telephone could have one and
could communicate with anyone else. Obviously, the public
utility commissions were expected to regulate pricing so that
subsidy flows could allow these goals to be achieved.""21 Other
commentators, however, take the contrary view that Vail coined
the term "for the altogether mundane purpose of eliminating
competition in telephone service and creating a monopoly for his
company." '213 Whether one subscribes to the theory that Vail was
the founder of contemporary universal service ideas or that he
promoted the egalitarian notion under a cloak of self-serving
interests, it is apparent that AT&T helped to bring the debate over
universal service to the forefront of the telecommunications
industry.
Just years after Bell's patent had lapsed, competition far
outstripped the number of lines produced under the monopoly.1 4
210 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 4. Although the phrase "universal service" is
an American creation, telecommunications experts use it worldwide. See id.
211 See id.
212 STONE, supra note 128, at 47.
213 THOMAS J. DUESTERBERG & KENNETH GORDON, COMPETITION AND
DEREGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE CASE FOR A NEW PARADIGM 48 (1997).
214 At the end of Bell's monopoly in 1894, only 270,000 phones existed in the
United States, concentrated almost exclusively in urban centers. See BROCK, supra note
115, at 122. After just thirteen years of competition, there were six million phones
(almost evenly divided between independents and Bell) with services available virtually
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Despite the growth in phone service, by the 1920s Congress and
federal regulators seemed willing to acquiesce to AT&T's massive
market power. 2" Even state public utility commissions began to
accept Vail's notion that "in exchange for monopoly privileges,
telephone companies are stewards charged with rendering cheap,
efficient service of high and improving quality. '216  National and
international governments justified this notion of exclusive rights
to provide service in the telecommunications market based on the
natural monopoly economics of the industry."7
Monopolies seem unavoidable in telecommunications given
"the high cost of fixed plant, the steadily declining average cost of
service, and the need for all customers to interconnect with one
another. 2 8  Even given the economies of scale inherent in the
telecom market, monopolists still needed extra revenue in order to
meet their universal service obligation. Nearly all world-wide
telecommunications providers have historically depended on a
complex system of cross-subsidies to meet this monetary
• 2 19
exigency. In short, cross-subsidies operate by providers
overcharging long distance and urban customers in order tosubsdizelocl an rurl •220
subsidize local and rural service. Furthermore, monopolists used
these cross-subsidies to protect their markets from competition.
Specifically, telecommunications monopolists have asserted
that their ability to provide low cost universal service would be
impeded by cream skimming competitors.222 In other words,
anywhere in the United States. See id.
215 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the
Willis-Graham Act on AT&T's monopolistic expansion).
216 STONE, supra note 128, at 52.
217 See supra note 8 (defining the concept of "natural monopolies").
218 HUBER, supra note 131, at 4.
219 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 1-2; see also West, supra note 9 (explaining the
cross-subsidy system).
220 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 150-51. In addition, telecommunications
providers in the EU often cross-subsidies the cost of basic residential services by
charging excessive rates on international calls. See FRIEDEN, supra note 69, at 17.
221 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
222 Cream skimming "occurs when a company attempts to sell to the most
profitable customers, or offers only those services that generate the best profit margin.
One might think of Federal Express and UPS as skimming the cream from the U.S.
Postal Service, for example." BONNET, supra note 56, at 142; see also TEMIN, supra
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because competitive providers do not have a universal service
obligation, they could choose to provide services in any market.
Of course, common sense would dictate that these competitors
would choose to service those markets with the lowest-cost routes.
Thus, if a monopolist firm charges $0.50 above its cost in
Location A to offset the higher cost of service in Location B, a
competitor with no universal service obligation could undercut the
monopolist's business by providing Location A with service at
cost.23 In order to compete, the monopolist would be forced to
either lower its rates (thus losing the cross-subsidy) or raise rates
in the high cost area (thereby undermining one of the basic
principles of universal service-affordable rates). 24 As the next
section illustrates, in the past ten years both the United States and
the EU have implemented legislation that reduces, if not
eliminates, the reliance on these implicit subsidies. 25
B. Universal Service in the European Union
1. Legislation
Historically, no harmonization of universal service obligations
at a European level existed.26 Any obligation was set at a national
level and, in the absence of competition, results varied. 27  The
Commission eliminated this disjunctive approach in November
1993, when it adopted a Communication on the development of
universal service in a competitive market .22  The next step the EU
note 113, at 30-31 (explaining AT&T's cream skimming argument in the Above 890
ruling).
223 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1347 (1998).
224 See id.
225 See infra notes 226-441 and accompanying text.
226 See Communication to the European Parliament, the Council the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Universal service for
telecommunications in the perspective of fully liberalized environment-an essential
element of the information society, COM(96)73 final at 6 [hereinafter Universal Service
in a Liberalized Environment].
227 See id.
228 See Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee: Developing Universal Service for
Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, COM(93)543 final. The proposal
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took toward a cohesive universal service policy came in December
1995 with the passage of the ONP Voice Telephony Directive.229
The ONP Voice Telephony Directive states that "the
fundamental requirement of universal service is to provide users
with a connection to the fixed public telephone network, at a fixed
location, at an affordable price."23 Taken in the aggregate with the
funding provisions set forth in the ONP Interconnection
Directive2 1' and the requirements in the Full Competition
Directive,232 a clear picture develops for "the maximum set of
services whose cost may be taken into account in calculating any
burden associated with universal service obligations and
identify[ing] the operators who can be made to contribute to that
burden."233
In March 1996, the Commission published a second
Communication on universal service examining the scope and
affordability of a universal service obligation. 34  A third
Communication was published in November of 1996.235 This
Communication provided practical guidelines on detailed aspects
of universal service, including: how to calculate the cost of
universal service using "long-run average incremental cost
methodology"; pragmatic recommendations on operating a
universal service fund or other funding devices; and determining
who would contribute to a funding mechanism and at what
was subsequently endorsed by both the Council and the Parliament. See Council
Resolution 94/C 48/01 of 7 February 1994 on Universal Service Principles in the
Telecommunications Sector 1994 O.J. (C 48) 1, 2; European Parliament Resolution A3-
0317/94 of 6 May 1994 on the Communication from the Commission Accompanied by
the Proposal for a Council Resolution on Universal Service Principles in the
Telecommunications Sector, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 551-52.
229 See ONP Voice Telephony Directive, supra note 5.
230 Id.
231 See ONP Interconnection Directive, supra note 102.
232 See Full Competition Directive, supra note 95.
233 European Commission DGXIII/A/I of 6 October 1998, Status Report on
European Union Telecommunications Policy 1, 18 [hereinafter Status Report].
234 See Universal Service in a Liberalized Environment, supra note 226; see e.g.,
Status Report, supra note 233, at 19.
235 Communication of 27 November 1996 on Assessment Criteria for National
Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommunications and
Guidelines for the Member States on the Operations of Such Schemes COM(96)608.
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211percentage the contribution would be set. 36 In a final move to
strengthen and adapt universal service to a competitive
environment, the European Parliament and Council adopted a
revised ONP Voice Telephony Directive on February 26, 1998.237
2. Current State of Universal Service in the European
Union
In the fully liberalized EU telecommunications market, there
are nine Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK)
which have decided that their markets can be opened to
competition without apportioning the cost of universal service to
other market players." 8 The remaining Member States (excluding
Greece whose legislation is not at a comparable advanced stage)
have opted to implement a universal service fund.239 However, of
these five, only France and Italy currently have a working fund in
place.240 The following is a more comprehensive analysis of what
efforts, if any, Member States are taking.
Belgium
Belgian legislation has named the telecommunications
operator Belgacom as the provider of universal service. 24' There
are no plans to implement a national funding mechanism prior to
the year 2000 and the Belgian government has not adopted a
detailed procedure for calculating the net cost of universal
service.2 42 Furthermore, the present scope of universal services
extends outside the EU-defined framework and allows for tariff
236 See Status Report, supra note 233, at 19.
237 See id.
238 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
Council, Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions: First
Monitoring Report on Universal Service in Telecommunications in the European Union,
COM(98)101 at 18 [hereinafter First Monitoring Report].
239 See id.
240 See id. at Annex I, Table 13.
241 See European Commission of 25 November 1998 Fourth Report on the
Implementation of the Telecom Regulatory Package, COM (98) 594, at Annex 4.4
[hereinafter Fourth Report].
242 See id.
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243discounts for journalists and the Belga agency.
Denmark
Denmark currently has no mechanism for funding universal
service.' 44  Thus, there is no operator contribution presently
required, although Denmark has appointed Tele Denmark as its
Universal Service Operator from January 1, 1998, through
December 31, 2007.14 ' The National Telecommunications Agency
has set maximum prices for universal services that must be cost
based and decrease in real terms by 4% in 1999 and 2000 and
6.8% in 2001.246
Germany
Deutsche Telekom currently provides universal service in
Germany.' 47 However, there is no present scheme for funding
universal service.248
Greece
By the terms of its license, the Greek telecommunications
operator OTE is the provider of universal service.2 49 At this time,
Greece has no universal service funding mechanism established.25 °
Spain
Spain has appointed Telefonica de Espana S.A. as the
country's universal service provider until the year 2006.251
Contributions to the net cost of providing universal service can
only be collected after approval of Telefonica's cost accounting
252
system.
France
The French have a fully operating universal service fund.253
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 See id.
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The French Telecommunications Act of 1996254 defines universal
service as:
[T]he provision to all, respecting the principles of equality,
continuity, universality, and adaptability of quality telephone
service at an affordable price, as well as free routing of
emergency calls, the provision of an information service and a
telephone book, in printed and electronic form, and the
servicing of the national territory by telephone booths installed
255
on the public domain.
France Telecom has been designated as the temporary
exclusive provider of universal services in France."' An interim
interconnection surcharge (lasting until December 31, 2000, at
latest) has been established for the purpose of funding the net cost
of overall geographic supply.2 7  This financial burden on new
entrants has created a "substantial market entry barrier.
' 258
Ireland
There is currently no clear definition in Ireland of what
provisions should be included in universal service and thus there is
no funding mechanism in place.259  In accordance with the
Interconnection Directive, Ireland can establish a funding
mechanism only if it is determined that Telecom Eireann incurs an
unfair burden in the net cost of discharging its universal service
obligation.
Italy
The Italian Universal Service Fund is scheduled to begin
service in 1999 and will be applied retroactively based on
254 See Law No. 96-659 of July 26, 1996, J.O., July 27, 1996, p. 11384; 1996 O.J.
(L 74) 13 (amending 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10) (on the implementation of full competition
in telecommunications markets); 1995 O.J. (L 321) 6 (on the application of open
network provision "ONP" to voice telephony)) [hereinafter French Act].
255 Lucien Rapp, The New French Telecommunications Law, 6 COMPUTER LAW
20, 22 (quoting Section L. 32-7 of the French Act).
256 See id. at 23.
257 See First Monitoring Report, supra note 238, at Annex I, Table 13.
258 See Fourth Report, supra note 241.
259 See id.
260 See id.
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companies' returns in 1998."' Telecom operators have expressed
trepidation that the inclusion of proposed elements in the
calculation of net cost will lead to an excessive estimation of that
cost, thereby impeding competition."'
Luxembourg
The government believes that universal service is alreadybeing provded n .. 263
being provided in practice. Therefore, no operator has been
appointed to provide universal service and no funding mechanism
has been established. 264
The Netherlands
The Netherlands' telecommunication authority has decided
that its markets can be opened to competition without apportioning
the cost of universal service to other market players . Should
universal service no longer be available under normal market
conditions, an operator could be appointed to provide service in a
designated area for a five-year period. 66 The assignment of a
universal service obligation would be done through a comparative
analysis of all service providers with significant market power in
the designated area.2 67 The obligation would be imposed on the
operator who could provide the requisite service at the lowest net
cost.
2 6
Austria
At present, the incumbent operator Telecom Austria (TA) is
obligated to provide universal service 2 6 9 Austrian statutes allow
the National Regulatory Authority to set up and manage a
universal service fund if one becomes necessary.2 70 As a practical
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id.
19991 145
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
matter, however, a fund is not envisioned in the near future.27" ' In
order to be eligible for compensation from the fund, the universal
service provider must have less than an 80% share of the public
voice telephony market. 2 Since TA exceeds this criterion, no
contributions from other operators will be required until TA's
market share drops below 80%.273
Portugal
Portugal Telecom has been charged with Portugal's universal
service obligation. 4 At present, no competitive entrants in the
liberalized market are required to contribute to the net cost of
universal service. 75
Finland
Finland requires that all fixed telecommunication operators
provide universal and advance service as mandated by EU
Directives. 276 Finland, however, does not view these obligations as
universal service, but rather as the operators' general
responsibilities to provide service and development to the people
of Finland.277  There has been no national funding of these
requirements, nor is there any future funding device envisioned.278
Sweden
The operator Telia currently provides universal service.
Given the low cost of providing universal service, Telia does not
receive contributions from other carriers towards its net costs.
280
There are no plans to develop a funding mechanism in the near
future.'
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 See id.
274 See id.
2175 See id.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 See id.
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United Kingdom
Currently, the operators British Telecom (BT) and Kingston
provide universal service on the basis of an obligation in their
licensing agreements."' OFTEL (Office of Telecommunications),
the British regulatory agency, has held that BT and Kingston are
not under any undue burden as a result of their universal service
obligations.83  Consequently, other operators are not under a
responsibility to contribute to the funding of universal service.
'
C. Universal Service in the United States
1. Legislation
Many scholars consider the Communications Act of 1934285 to
be the first attempt to endorse the concept of universal service
through legislation.286 These proponents cite the broad language
contained in the Act's preamble as authority. Specifically, they
cite the provision requiring the FCC "to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." '287 Other
scholars have noted the peculiar exclusion of the term "universal
service" from both the 1934 Act and the thousands of pages in the
Congressional Record during debate and preparation of the Act.
288
Therefore, although it could be argued that the broad coverage of
the 1934 Act mandates the concept of universal service,"289 the
notable absence of the term from any of the legislative materials
suggests a more logical origin of universal service in American
law.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See supra note 58.
286 See BONNEIF, supra note 56, at 89; see also TEMIN, supra note 113, at 11
(suggesting -that with the passage of the 1934 Act, the twin pillars of telephone
regulation were "universal service and nondiscriminatory rates").
287 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
288 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 6.
289 See Gandara, supra note 6, at 110.
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The current concept of universal service (i.e., affordable and
accessible phone connections) can be traced to the late 1960s with
the introduction of competition in long-distance markets.2 ° For
the first time, AT&T faced competition from new long-distance
networks, such as MCI.29' These new competitors had a built-in
cost advantage over AT&T since they were not required to allocate
a portion of their costs for local service.2 " AT&T and state
regulators feared that this new competition would destroy the
system of cross-subsidies, which helped to keep prices low forS 2 9 3
local service. During the ensuing struggle to find explicit
justifications for the current system of cross-subsidization, "the
concept of universal service was redefined in a way that linked it
to the practice of regulated monopoly.2 94  Consequently, the
theory prevailed that regulated monopolies allowed the United
States to obtain and sustain a phone system that was both
universally available and affordable.295  Arguments refuting this
revisionist history were essentially nullified when Congress
explicitly endorsed the concept of universal service in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.296
Section 254 of TA 96 is entirely dedicated to universal service
in America's phone market.297 The Senate committee report that
accompanied the draft proposal of TA 96 explained that the goal
of Section 254 is "to clearly articulate the policy of Congress that
universal service is a cornerstone of the Nation's communications
290 See DUESTERBERG & GORDON, supra note 213, at 48.
291 See generally supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC
ruling allowing MCI entrance into the long-distance market).
292 See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 163.
293 See id. at 162-63.
294 Id.
295 See id.
296 See TA 96, supra note 2.
297 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1999). Notably, under § 254(h)
telecommunication providers are required to provide discounts to schools and libraries
for services used for educational purposes. While this educational rate (E-rate) is an
important concept toward expanding universal service, it falls outside the scope of this
paper. For an in-depth analysis of § 254(h), see Roxana E. Cook, Note, All Wired Up:
An Analysis of the FCC's Order to Internally Connect Schools, 50 FED. COMM. L. J. 215
(1997).
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system. This new section is intended to make explicit the current
implicit authority of the FCC and the States to require common
carriers to provide universal service."'2 98 Pursuant to Section
254(a), the FCC established a Federal Joint Board299 to make
suggestions on ways to implement Section 254. 300
The FCC adopted the Joint Board's November 8, 1996
recommendation almost in its entirety on May 7, 1997.30 ' In the
FCC plan, universal service was defined to include:
0 2
" Voice grade access to the telephone network, with the
ability to place and receive calls;
" Touch tone service;
* Single party service;
" Access to emergency services, including 911 and enhanced
911 (where available);3 3
" Access to operator services;
" Access to interexchange (long distance) service;
" Access to directory assistance; and
" The continuation of federal Lifeline304  and Linkup °5
298 MUELLER, supra note 6, at 163 (quoting Committee Report on the
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995 (Lawrence Pressler,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation to June E.
O'Neill, Director, Congressional Budget Office (March 28, 1995))).
299 The Joint Board is comprised of eight members-three FCC commissioners,
four state commissioners and one state utility consumer advocate. See Brad E.
Mutschelknaus, 465 PLI/Pat 109, n.33.
" See id. at 140.
3o See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45,
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997), as corrected by Federal-State Joint Board
on Universal Service, Errata, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 97-157 (rel. June 4, 1997)
[hereinafter Universal Service Order].
302 See Federal Communications Commission, Common Carrier Action,
Commission Implements Telecom Act's Universal Service Provisions, CC 97-24, May
7, 1997, available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 2332.
303 Enhanced 911 or E-911 is a service that stores the caller's phone number and
location to expedite the emergency unit's response time. See BONNETr, supra note 56,
at 144.
30 Lifeline is a federal program that ensures low-income subscribers access to
phone service by waiving any applicable monthly subscriber line charges. See id. at
148.
305 The Link-Up America program helps low-income consumers gain access to
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programs for qualifying end-users.
Although these are the current minimum set of provisions
included in universal service, TA 96 gives flexibility to the
definition, noting that "[u]niversal service is an evolving level of
telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish
periodically under this section, taking into account advances in
telecommunications and information technologies and services. 3 °6
Read together, sections 254 and 214 require the administration
of a universal service fund to be both competitively and
307technologically neutral in its effects on telecom operators. In
order to ensure this fact, TA 96 states that "[a]ll providers of
telecommunications services should make an equitable and
nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and
advancement of universal service."30 8  Furthermore, TA 96
prohibits local incumbents from taking advantage of historical
cross-subsidies by requiring that all universal service support be
"explicit."30 9 In order to be eligible for universal service support, a
provider must offer those services as part of the mandated
definition and advertise the availability of these services
throughout the region. °
Another important portion of TA 96 is Section 254(f). This
section gives the states explicit authority to design their own
intrastate universal service fund. Specifically, the section declares:
A state may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the
commission's rules to preserve and advance universal service.
Every telecommunications service shall, contribute, on an
equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, in a manner determined
by the state to the preservation and advancement of universal
service in the state. A state may adopt regulations to provide
for additional definitions and standards to preserve and advance
universal service within the state only to the extent that such
regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not
the phone network by reducing customers' initial installation costs. See id.
306 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
307 See Mutschelknaus, supra note 299, at 144.
308 47 U.S.C.A..§ 254(b)(4) (West Supp. 1999).
309 See id. § 254(e).
310 See id. § 254(e)(1).
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rely on or burden federal universal service support
mechanisms." '
The majority of states, however, have not acted on this
authority.312
2. Current State of Universal Service in the United States
a. Federal Level
In its May 1997 Universal Service Order,"1 the FCC
determined that non-rural carriers would receive high cost support
from the Federal Universal Service Fund starting January 1,
1999.314 This support would be based on the forward-looking
economic costs of providing defined services subtracted from a
revenue benchmark amount.315 The FCC decided that support
coming from the federal fund should initially be set at 25% and
support from state sources should contribute the remaining 75%.316
On March 11, 1998, state members of the Joint-Board filed a
formal request with the FCC to have the full Joint-Board review
the level of federal funding for non-rural carriers.317
On July 13, 1998, the FCC issued an order referring the
question of high-cost support for non-rural providers to the Federal
State Joint-Board. 318 This action subsequently pushed back the
date for distribution of non-rural high cost funding to January, 1,
2000."'9 On November 23, 1998, the Joint-Board released its
311 Id. § 254(f).
312 See infra notes 325-76 and accompanying text.
313 See Universal Service Order, supra note 301.
314 See id. at 8910, para. 254. The FCC also decided that rural carriers would
continue to receive high-cost support via existing support mechanisms until at least
January 1, 2001. See id. at 8917-18, paras. 252-56.
315 See id. at 8899, para. 223.
316 See id. at 8925, para. 269.
317 See Federal C.C., CC Docket No. 96-45, Formal Request for Referral of
Designated Items by the State Members of the § 254 Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, filed March 11, 1998.
318 See Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 96-45, Order on
Reconsideration, FCC 98-160, adopted July 13, 1998 [hereinafter Order on
Reconsideration].
319 The original revised date of distribution was to be July 1, 1999. See id. para.
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recommendations. 20 These recommendations included:
" States should not receive less support than they currently
receive from federal high cost funding.
" The existing 25/75 jurisdictional division of support should be
replaced by a new methodology. Specifically, the Commission
should first determine what states could provide high-cost
funding. For those states that can not provide the needed
support, the federal fund should provide money only to the
extent that states are unable to support high-cost areas through
their own reasonable efforts.
• Support for high-cost areas should be based on forward-
looking economic costs.
* Line item end-user surcharges that charge consumers higher
rates than the carriers' own universal service obligation should
be prohibited.
" The FCC should take measures to ensure that end-users are not
misled by charges on their bill attributed to universal service.
" Furthermore, the Commission should prohibit operators from
labeling such charges as mandatory or federally approved.
" The Joint-Board and the FCC should reexamine mechanisms
for high cost universal service support as needed, but such a
review should come no later than July 1, 2001.
• The FCC should examine areas currently not served by phone
service and decide whether and how federal support could be
used to expand telecommunication service to these areas. 321
Since the FCC does not expect to implement the Joint Board's
recommendations until January 1, 2000,322 nearly all of the
attention on universal service has shifted to the states. Under
Section 254(f), the states have broad authority to act as the
4. However, the FCC later changed this date to January 1, 2000. See Federal
Communications Commission, CC Docket Nos. 96-45 and 97-160, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 99-120, adopted May 27, 1999, paras. 34, 243 [hereinafter
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
320 See FCC News, Report No. CC 98-41, Joint Board Makes Universal Service
Recommendations to FCC, Provides Guidance on Issues Concerning Support for Non
Rural Carriers That Serve High Cost Areas, November 23, 1998.
321 See id.
322 See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 319, paras. 34, 243.
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nation's laboratories on universal service.3 23  Nevertheless, a
majority of the states have either taken no action or are in the
administrative stages of implementing an intrastate universal
service fund.2
b. State Level
States Lacking Universal Service Funds
There are currently sixteen states that do not have a state
universal service fund in place nor any open docket in their utility
commissions contemplating such a fund.325  These states are
Arizona,326 Connecticut, 327 Delaware, Hawaii,"' Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland,33 °  Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New
323 See Gandara, supra note 6, at 118.
324 See infra notes 325-76 and accompanying text.
325 This data was derived from a combination of statuary analysis and an
extensive telephone survey of all fifty states' respective utility commissions.
Information concerning times, dates, or personnel relating to the telephone survey are on
file with the author.
326 Arizona has a universal service fund in place, but it assesses a charge against
all telecom providers on a rate-base application. This is not the type of assessment
methodology mandated by § 254(f) of TA 96. There is no open docket to address this
incongruity.
327 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-247e(b) (West Supp. 1998) grants the
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control the authority to establish a universal
service program if necessary. In Docket No. 94-0708, the department reviewed the issue
of a state universal service fund and ruled that one was not currently needed. The state,
however, does mandate support for a state Lifeline program. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 16-247e(a) (West Supp. 1998); see also Conn. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control,
Docket No. 97-0712.
328 The Hawaii Public Utilities Commission has been charged with the duty of
preserving and advancing universal service. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 269-35 (Michie
1998). The only action taken on the issue of establishing a universal service fund thus
far was the establishment of administrative rules. See Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n Admin.
R. tit. 6 Ch. 81.
329 Illinois does have a high-cost intrastate universal service mechanism that is
funded through voluntary contributions made by interexchange carriers. While
laudable, this current system does not met the mandate that "all providers of
telecommunications services should make an equitable and nondiscriminatory
contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service." TA 96, supra
note 2, § 254(b)(4).
311 Maryland has established a Universal Service Trust Fund program to fund the
cost of Lifeline and Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS is a service designed to
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Hampshire, New York,"' Pennsylvania,332 Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Virginia.333
States Currently with Open Dockets on Universal Service
Additionally, there are twenty states that have open dockets
(all at varying points in the hearing process) in their utility
commissions concerning the implementation of a state universal
service fund.
Alabama
The Alabama Public Service Commission currently has an
open docket concerning an intrastate pricing model for universal
service.
3 4
Florida
The legislature has the power to create a state universal service
fund, but this authority lapses on January 1, 2000."' Until
recently, the Florida Public Service Commission had an open
docket studying all aspects of a state universal service fund.336
Georgia
The Georgia State Legislature has mandated that a Universal
Access Fund (UAF) be established.33 7 The Georgia Public Service
Commission currently has an open docket on implementing the
help hearing impaired persons communicate with others over the telephone. The
American with Disabilities Act of 1990 mandated TRS systems). See MD. CODE ANN.
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 3-807 (1998).
331 The New York Public Service Commission has established a Targeted
Assistance Fund to offset costs of providing Lifeline and E-91 1. See NY. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Case 94-C-0095, Opinion 96-13, Opinion and Order Adopting Regulatory
Framework (issued May 22, 1996).
332 Pennsylvania has codified a network modernization implementation plan that
requires all local exchange operators to convert to universal broadband availability by
December 31, 2015. See PA. CONS. STAT. PUBL. UTIL. § 3003(b) (West 1999); see also
Penn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. M-00930441.
333 The Virginia State Corporation Commission does have an open case
concerning the schools and library issue under TA 96 § 254(h). See Va. State Corp.
Comm'n, Case No. PUC-970063.
334 See Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 25980
331 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.025(4)(a) (West 1998) as amended in FLA. A.L.S.
354 (1999).
336 See Fla. Pub. Service Comm'n, Docket No. 980696-TP.
337 See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-167(a) (1992).
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UAF.338 Although it is unclear what will constitute funding for this
program, at present it seems certain that it will not include an end-
user surcharge, as Georgia law forbids such a funding
mechanism. 39
Indiana
There is currently an intrastate Indiana high-cost fund (IHCF)
that predates the passage of TA 96.' 40 On November 5, 1997, the
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission initiated a process to bring
the IHCF into compliance with TA 96.341
Louisiana
Article IV Section 21 of the Louisiana Constitution is the root
of the Louisiana Public Service Commission's authority. Acting
on this authorization, the commission has defined those
obligations included in universal service.342 Notwithstanding this
definition, there is no universal service fund in place, although the
commission does have an open docket on the matter.343
Maine
The Maine Public Utilities Commission is granted the
authority, via legislation, to create a universal service fund.
34
There is an open inquiry in the commission on the policy goals of
an eventual universal service fund.345
Minnesota
The Minnesota Legislature has codified the state's obligations
to establish a universal service fund.346  The Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission currently has an open docket on the
131 See Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 5825-U.
339 See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-167(h) (1992).
340 See Report on Telecommunications Act of 1996 Prepared for the Regulatory
Flexibility Committee, <http://www.state.in.us/iurc/html/telecom.html (visited
September 6, 1999).
341 See Ind. Util. Reg. Comm'n, Cause No. 40785.
342 See In re: Definition of Universal Service, Gen. Ord., La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Docket No. U-20833-Subdocket A, May 22, 1995.
341 See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. U-20883 - Subdocket C.
344 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 35-A § 7104(3) (West 1998).
345 See Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 98-807.
346 See MINN. STAT. § 237.16(9) (1999).
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subject.:'
Missouri
A state universal service fund is mandated by legislation.348
The Public Service Commission has adopted the basic framework
for the Missouri Universal Service Fund.3 49  However, there has
been no service fund implemented and the issue is still in its
preliminary stages.350
Montana
The Montana Public Service Commission has the statutory
authority to create a universal service fund if such a device is
deemed necessary.35" ' This authority will terminate unless the state
legislature repeals the sunset provision contained in the statute.352
In response, the commission opened a docket on the matter on
December 31, 1999."' 3 In January 1999, the commission sent a
report to the Montana Legislature recommending that the sunset
date be repealed.354
Nevada
The Nevada Public Utilities Commission has held hearings
examining the issue of implementing a universal service fund.355
Furthermore, Nevada has defined the basic services and adopted
rule-making procedures for a universal service fund. 56
New Jersey
The Board of Public Utilities has held hearings on whether a
universal service fund is needed and, if so, how it should be
347 See Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. P-999/R97-609.
348 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.248(1) (1999).
349 See Ch. 31 Mo. P.S.C. RULES.
311 See Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. TO-98-329.
351 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-842(1) (1997).
352 See id. § 69-3-843.
313 See In the Matter of the Montana Public Service Commission's Report and
Recommendation to the 56th Montana Legislature on Universal Service and Universal
Access, Notice of Opportunity to Comment, Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No.
N98.9.202, Service Date September 11, 1998.
354 See Report to the 56th Legislature on Universal Service (High Cost) and
Universal Access in Telecommunications 3, Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, (January 1999).
351 See Nev. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 97-5018.
356 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 704 §§ 704.6804-704.68056.
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administered. 57
New Mexico
In 1985, the New Mexico State Corporation Commission
created a universal service fund.1 8 Currently, the commission is
studying how to bring the old fund into line with the requirements
of TA 96 Section 254(f).359
North Carolina
North Carolina's General Statutes require that the North
Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) provide for the continued
development and encouragement of universally available
telephone service at reasonably affordable rates.36° In an effort to
meet this obligation, the NCUC held hearings in the summer of
1998 on the issue of implementing an intrastate high-cost
universal service fund.36' As mandated by state law, the
commission shall "adopt final rules concerning the provision of
universal service" by July 21, 2001.362
North Dakota
There is no universal service fund currently in place and the
North Dakota Public Service Commission did not issue any order
in its most recent open docket.363 On September 10, 1998, the
Commission held a public hearing to obtain initial information on
the possibility of a future intrastate universal service fund.364
351 See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., Docket No. TX-9512-0631.
358 See N. Mex. State Corp. Comm'n, Docket No. 11-15.
359 See In re implementation of new rules related to rural, high cost and low
income components of the New Mexico Universal Service Fund, N. Mex. State Corp.
Comm'n, Docket No. 96-310 merged with Docket No. 97-334 TC. Legislation passed
in 1999 ordered the Public Regulation Commission to implement a Universal Service
Fund which is to be in place by January 1, 2000 and to combine the fund created in 1985
with the newly created Universal Service Fund. See N. Mex. State Corp. Comm'n,
Docket No. 3111.
360 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-11 0(f)(1) (1998).
361 See In re Establishement of Intrastate Universal Service Support Mechanisms
Pursuant to G.S. 62-100(f)(1) and Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
N.C. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. P-100, Sub. 133g.
362 North Carolina Senate Bill No. 1008 (SB 1008), session of 1999.
363 See N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case No. PU-439-98-299.
364 See Notice of Hearing and Informational Meeting, N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Case No. PU-439-98-299, July 15, 1998.
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Ohio
The Ohio Public Utilities Commission has the "power and
jurisdiction as is reasonably necessary for the Commission to
perform the acts of a state commission pursuant to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 365 The commission has opened
a docket to study the issue of implementing a state universal
service fund.366
Oregon
In 1984, the Oregon Public Utilities Commission created a
universal service fund based on the National Exchange Carrier
Association (NECA) embedded cost approach.367 Currently, the
commission is studying how to establish a fund on the approach
mandated in TA 96 Section 254.368
South Carolina
The South Carolina legislature codified the establishment of a
state universal service fund.369  Complying with its statutory
obligation, the South Carolina Public Service Commission is
holding hearings on guidelines for implementation, cost, and
funding obligations.37
Tennessee
The Tennessee Code authorizes the Tennessee Regulatory
Authority to create a universal service fund at its discretion.37' The
commission has completed the first stage of hearings on
implementation of a fund. This phase dealt with non-cost issues,
such as what services are to be supported, eligible telecom carriers
and how the fund should be structured.3
Washington
The Washington State Legislature has authorized the
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission to adopt a
365 Senate Bill No. 306 (SB 306) passed by the 121st Ohio General Assembly.
366 See Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 97-632-TP-CO.
367 See Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. UM-384, Order No. 93-1133.
368 See Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. UM-73 1.
369 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-280(E) (1998).
370 See S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 97-239-C.
371 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-5-207 (1998).
372 See Tenn. Pub. Service Comm'n, Docket No. 97-00888.
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universal service program consistent with Section 254(0 of TA
96."' Pursuant to this authority, the commission opened a docket
concerning universal service.374 On December 2, 1998, the
commission filed proposed rules revising universal service
mechanisms. Subsequently, on January 6, 1999, the commission
issued a Notice for submission of comments on the proposed
rules.37
West Virginia
The West Virginia Public Service Commission has not
mandated the establishment of a universal service fund; however,
they have consolidated the issue into one case."'
States with Operational Universal Service Funds
Fourteen other states have completed the hearing process and
have implemented an intrastate high-cost universal service fund.
The required provisions, however, differ from state to state. The
following paragraphs will give a brief overview of each state's
37respective programs.
Alaska
Alaska's universal service fund is in place and became
effective March 1, 1999.378 Contributors mirror those identified by
the FCC in 47 CFR Section 703 and contributions are based on a
percentage of intrastate end-user revenues."'
Arkansas
The Arkansas Legislature has established the Arkansas
Universal Service Fund (AUSF).38° The legislature also has
defined the minimum services to be included in the definition of
373 See WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.610 (1999).
374 See Wash. Util. and Trans. Comm'n, Docket No. UT 980311 (a).
375 See Notice of Opportunity to Submit Written Comments on Proposed Rules,
Wash. Util. and Trans. Comm'n, Docket No. CR-102, January 6, 1999.
376 See W.Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 97-0103-T-GI, consolidated Case
No. 960994-TP.
177 See infra notes 377-441 and accompanying text.
378 See Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. R-97-6, Order Nos. 7 & 8.
171 See id.
380 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-404(a) (Michie 1997).
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universal service.38' Currently, however, only the revenue
replacement piece of the AUSF is being implemented. This
mechanism allows recovery of funds lost through the closing of
the IntraLATA toll pool.382  Service providers are required to
contribute a percentage of their intrastate retail
telecommunications service revenue to the fund, but can pass this
cost on to consumers via an end-user surcharge.383
California
The Public Utilities Commission has mandated both an
intrastate high cost and Lifeline fund Pursuant to California
Code.38 4 These services are funded by an end-user surcharge.385
The moratorium on high cost fund distributions to large service
providers was lifted, with the creation of the California High Cost
Fund-B (CHCF-B), in October 1996.386 Effective January 1, 1999,
the CHCF-B surcharge is set at 3.8%.387 This amount is paid by
end-users, via a line item surcharge on their monthly bill, and is
then remitted by the service provider.388
Colorado
Under Colorado Revised Statute Section 40-15-208, the Public
Utilities Commission is authorized to create a universal service
fund. This fund came into effect on January 1, 1999.389 The
funding is provided through a fee assigned against telecom
provider's intrastate calling revenue, and is set at an interim rate of
0.2%.390 This fee will be collected through an end-user surcharge.
381 See id. § 23-17-403(27).
382 See Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 97-041R.
383 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-404(b) (Michie 1997).
384 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739.3.
385 See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Resolution No. T-16244.
386 See id. The CHCF-B currently provides support for high cost areas served by:
Pacific Bell, GTE California, Citizens Telecom of California and Roseville Telephone
Company. See id.
387 See id.
388 See id.
389 See Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 98M-236T, Decision No. C 98-
1059.
390 See id.
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Idaho
As mandated by the Idaho Code, a universal service fund is
currently operational."' An end user surcharge funds the
program.9 2 The amount of the surcharge is reassessed every year
and is currently $0.12 for residential lines and $0.24 for business
lines.393
Kansas
As set forth in Kansas law, the Kansas Universal Service Fund
(KUSF) has been established. 34 The fund is paid into by every
telecommunications carrier and wireless telecommunications
provider based on a percentage of intrastate revenue.395  In turn,
any provider paying into the KUSF can pass an equal amount of
its contribution on to the customer as an end-user surcharge.
39 6
Kentucky
The Kentucky Universal Service Fund is scheduled to begin
operation on January 1, 1999. 39' The implementation of the Fund
will be piecemeal, however, as support only for Lifeline will be
operational, with the high cost fund beginning operation on July 1,
1999.398 Funding for Lifeline support comes from an end-user
surcharge of $.05 per month/per line on all ILEC, CLEC and
wireless bills.399
Nebraska
Section 86-1405 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska created
391 See IDAHO CODE § 62-61 OF (1999).
392 See id. § 62-610F(2).
391 See Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, Case No. GNR-T-98-3, Order No. 27380.
394 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-2008 (1998).
395 See id. § 66-2008(b).
396 See id.
397 See In re Universal Service and Funding Issues, KY Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Admin. Case No.360 at 1 (August 7, 1998).
398 See id. at 1-4. The date for high cost support has been moved back in
accordance with the FCC timetable for implementation. See generally supra note 319
(discussing the FCC's decision to revise the date of federal distribution to January 1,
2000).
399 See id. at 4. The surcharge is to be shown as a separate line item on the
customers' bill denoted by "Kentucky Lifeline Support." See id.
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the Nebraska Universal Service Fund (NUSF).400 The Nebraska
Public Service Commission issued an order outlining the structure
of the NUSF on January 13, 1999.40 1 Support for the fund will
come from a surcharge assessed on retail, end-user revenues from
telecommunications services. °2 This surcharge will be applied on
all interstate and intrastate telecommunication services regardless
of the underlying technology used to provide the services.4 3
Oklahoma
Oklahoma has two distinct funds in place to help defray the
cost of providing telecommunication services. First, there is the
Oklahoma High Cost Fund.404 This fund is essentially an intrastate
toll-pooling system. All intrastate toll providers are required to
contribute to the fund based on their retail bill minutes of use.405
Oklahoma has also established a state universal service fund: the
Oklahoma Universal Service Fund (OUSF) provides support for
Lifeline, E-911, and primary parity between intrastate and
interstate calling.406 Furthermore, the state legislature has defined
a minimum level of primary universal service. Contributions for
the OUSF are to be made in a competitively neutral manner by all
telecommunications providers. 408 Specifically, funding is derived
from a percentage of each carrier's total intrastate regulated and
unregulated revenues. 409  Telecommunication providers can, at
their option, recover the cost of their OUSF contributions via an
end-user surcharge.410
400 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-1405 (1998).
401 See Re Investigation into Intrastate Access Charge Reform, NE Pub. Service
Comm'n, App. No. C-1628 (Jan. 13, 1999).
402 See id.
401 See id.
404 See Okla. Corp. Comm'n, Cause Nos. PUD 950000117 and 950000119, Order
No. 399040.
405 See id.
406 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, §139.106 (1999).
407 See id. § 139.102(19).
408 See id. § 139.107(A).
409 See id.
410 See id. § 139.106(E).
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Texas
The Texas Legislature established an intrastate universal
service funding mechanism in 1987. 4" On December 3, 1998, the
Texas Public Utility Commission approved an order establishing
an interim Texas Universal Service Fund (TUSF).4 2 The size of
the interim fund was established at nearly $87 million annually,
with accompanying support contributed through an assessment of
0.79 percent of operators' total taxable telecommunication
receipts.4 " The current TUSF funds three programs: Relay
W 414 4 5416Texas, Tele-Assstance, and a high-cost assistance program.
The high-cost assistance aspects of the TUSF can be divided
into two categories of services: the Texas High-Cost Universal
Service Plan (THCUSP) 4 7 and the Small and Rural ILEC Plan.418
In an agreement with the Southwestern Bell, GTE Southwest,
Sprint-Centel, and Sprint-United, the commission agreed to
postpone implementation of the THCUSP in exchange for these
companies reducing customer access-rates.4 9 The Small and Rural
ILEC Plan enjoyed a much different fate. Pursuant to a December
3, 1998 order,420 the commission set the annual support for the
Small and Rural ILEC Universal Service Plan at $51,202,987.41
Of this money, $32,941,082 is earmarked to compensate small and
411 See TEX. UTILITIES CODE ANN. § 56.021 (WEST 1998).
412 See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Implementation of P.U.C. SUBST. R. 23,150(f)
and (g), Project No. 19655.
413 See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Report to the 76th Texas Legislature on Scope of
Competition in Telecommunications Markets of Texas, 42 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter
Texas Report].
414 Relay Texas is the name used for the Texas Telecommunications Relay
System (TRS). See id.
415 Tele-Assistance Service is a program that provides low-income residential
consumers basic phone service at a reduced price. See id.
416 See id. at 39.
417 See P.U.C. SUBST. R. 23.133.
418 See P.U.C. SUBST. R. 23.134.
419 See Texas Report, supra note 413, at 43.
420 See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Docket No. 18516, interim order of Dec. 3,
1998.
421 See Texas Report, supra note 413, at 44. This money is to be allocated from
the TUSF. See id. at 42 n.56.
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rural ILECs for losses incurred with the termination of the
IntraLATA toll pool.42  The remainder of the fund is to remunerate
ILECs for reductions in their IntraLATA toll rates to a level where
423
no call costs more than $0.20 per minute.
Utah
The Utah Public Service Commission is vested with the
authority to establish and maintain an intrastate universal service
424fund. Acting on this authority, the commission implemented a
fund financed by a one percent surcharge on all
telecommunication carriers' intrastate revenue.425 This cost can be
426passed on to consumers via a line item end-user surcharge. The
fund is used to defray telecom operators' costs in participating in
Lifeline programs or providing service to high cost-areas.427
Vermont
Vermont funds its state universal service program through an
end-user surcharge. 42' For the 1999 fiscal year, the rate for the
end-user surcharge is 1.06% of all retail telecommunication11 421
services provided to a Vermont address. Money raised via the
universal service surcharge is spent on support for Vermont
430Lifeline, E-91 1, and Vermont TRS services.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin mandated the establishment of an intrastate
universal service fund in its state statutes. 43' The Wisconsin Public
Service Commission has defined universal service as:
[A] statewide rapid, efficient, communications network with
adequate, economically placed facilities to assure that a basic
set of essential telecommunications services is available to all
422 See id. at 44.
423 See id.
424 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-8b-15 (Supp. 1997).
425 See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R746-360-5 (1999).
426 See id.
427 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-8b-15(7) (Supp. 1997).
428 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 7521 (Supp. 1998).
429 See Vt. Pub. Service. Bd., Docket No. 6084.
430 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 7511.
431 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.218 (West Supp. 1998).
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persons in this state at affordable prices and that the advance
service capabilities of a modern telecommunications
infrastructure are affordable and accessible to all areas of the
432
state within a reasonable time.
The current Wisconsin Universal Service Fund allows
distributions to help support the following programs: Link-Up
America, Lifeline, voice mail service for the homeless, special
needs equipment vouchers, the telecommunications customer
assistance program, high-rate assistance credits, alternative
universal service protection plans, rate shock mitigation, assistance
for institutions, and IntraLATA toll service provider of last
resort.433 Funding is procured by assessing a percentage of each
provider's gross intrastate operating revenues derived from
telecommunication services.434  Any provider with intrastate
revenues less than $200,000 for the preceding year is exempted
from contribution.435  Furthermore, contributing tele-
communications providers are prohibited from establishing an
end-user surcharge to recoup their funding obligations.436 On
February 9, 1999, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
issued notice of an April 6, 1999, hearing on a proposed
amendment to current universal service rules.437
Wyoming
The Wyoming State Legislature has codified the establishmentt- 1438
of an intrastate universal service fund. Any company is eligible
for funding if its local exchange rates (minus any support from the
Federal USF) exceeds 130 percent of the weighted statewide
average. Funding for the WUSF is through an end-user
surcharge. 440 Furthermore, any operator receiving funds from the
432 Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. PSC, § 160.02(9).
413 See id. §160.05.
434 See id. § 160.18(3).
435 See id. § 160.18(1)(a).
436 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.218(3)(e) (West Supp. 1998).
437 See Notice of Hearing, Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 1-AC-166, (Feb.
9, 1999).
438 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 37-15-501(a) (Lexis 1999).
431 See id. § 37-15-501(d).
440 See generally Procedural Rules of the Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n Ch. V §
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WUSF must display the amount of such support on each affected
customer's bill as a separate line item.4"'
V. Conclusion
Over the last ten years, the European Union and the United
States have introduced legislation that has brought the prospect of
full competition to their respective telecommunications markets.
By introducing competition, however, these governments have
undercut the traditional mechanisms telecommunications providers
have used to ensure universal service. Based on past experience in
the United States, a convincing argument can be made that
competition will continue to increase telephone penetration rates. 42
Yet, history has also proven that while competition produces
market abundance, it also creates uneven distribution."3
The basic rubric of universal service should be affordable
telephone service to all parts of a country. Without the implicit
subsidies of old, it is incumbent upon American and EU regulatory
authorities to ensure that this basic objective is met. Furthermore,
regulators can never hope to successfully promote advanced
networks capable of the ever-growing data transfer rates required
in our information society if citizens cannot even obtain "plain old
telephone service" at affordable prices. In order to help secure that
present and future policy goals for telecommunications are met,
the EU and American governments have to continue providing the
catalyst for their member states to promote universal service
within their borders.
WILLIAM P. CASSIDY, JR.
500 (outlining the contribution and distribution mechanisms for the WUSF).
441 See id. § 500(q)(iii).
442 See generally supra note 214 (discussing the rise of competition in American
telephony after the lapse of Alexander Graham Bell's patent).
443 See HUBER, supra note 131, at 140.
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